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Trading with Bandits
Peter T. Leeson West Virginia University
Abstract
Is it possible to trade with bandits? When government is absent, the superior
strength of some agents makes it cheaper for them to violently steal what they
desire from weaker agents than to use trade to obtain what they want. Such
was the case with middlemen who interacted with producers in late precolonial
west central Africa. In the face of this threat, producers employed two mech-
anisms to make exchange with middlemen possible. On the one hand, they
used credit to alter middlemen’s cost-benefit structure of engaging in plunder
versus trade. On the other hand, producers demanded tribute from traveling
traders as a risk premium. By transforming traveling traders’ incentive from
banditry to peaceful trade and reducing producers’ costs associated with inter-
acting with middlemen, these mechanisms enhanced both parties’ ability to
capture the gains from exchange.
How wonderful is commerce. (David Livingstone [1963, p. 32],
nineteenth-century British explorer of the remote interior of west
central Africa)
1. Introduction
No sane economist would argue that it is possible to trade with bandits. We
have all learned that the market alone is insufficient to prevent the strong from
plundering the weak. Indeed, the threat of violence is perhaps the oldest, most
well accepted justification for government. Even Adam Smith ([1776] 1965, p.
670) believed this was true: “It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate
that the owner of . . . property . . . can sleep a single night in security. He is
at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked,
he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the
powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it.”
The market, however, might be better at negotiating threats of violence than
I am grateful to Robert Bates, Peter Boettke, Tyler Cowen, Chris Coyne, Andrei Shleifer, Melissa
Thomas, Richard Wagner, the editors, and an anonymous referee for indispensable comments and
suggestions. I also benefited from the comments of seminar participants at Harvard University, where
I presented an earlier draft of this paper. The financial assistance of the Oloffson Weaver Fellowship
is gratefully acknowledged.
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we once thought. Could economists have underestimated the market’s power
and beauty in this regard?
A growing body of research considers how agents can overcome dishonesty
where state enforcement is absent (see, for instance, Clay 1997; Greif 1989, 1993;
Kranton 1996; Landa 1994; Leeson 2006; Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990;
Zerbe and Anderson 2001). These studies, however, exclusively consider com-
mitment problems that involve the potential for what might be called “peaceful
theft” in that recourse to physical violence is not used to take advantage of the
wronged party. For peaceful theft, a separation of payment and provision, not
a difference in actual strength, accounts for an individual’s ability to defraud his
or her exchange partner.
Equally important when government is absent is what might be called “violent
theft.” Here the perpetrator is a bandit who uses physical force to overwhelm
his or her victim. His or her superior strength gives him or her the ability to
defraud others.
Introducing bandits into standard models of peaceful theft can cause them to
break down. These models rely in various ways on the folk theorem to work.
The shadow of the future in conjunction with the threat of multilateral pun-
ishment can create cooperation if agents are patient enough. But when some
agents are sufficiently stronger than others, multilateral punishment may no
longer secure cooperation. Weaker agents can eternally boycott stronger agents
who behave violently, but boycott does not prevent stronger agents from simply
taking what they want from weaker ones.
This need not always be the case. If the stronger agent is stationary but the
weaker agent is mobile, boycott is effective. This is the case, for instance, in the
medieval situation described by Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994). However,
in situations where individuals have disparate strengths and stronger agents are
mobile while weaker ones are not, multilateral punishment cannot work. Weaker
agents may refuse to interact with stronger individuals who behaved violently
toward them in the past, but if they cannot run and the stronger agents can,
their refusal will not prevent them from being plundered again. Something other
than the threat of lost revenue from repeated exchange is needed to create
cooperation.
Unlike peaceful theft, the topic of violent theft has received relatively little
attention. Existing models that consider the potential for violent theft assume
that both parties can transform their resources into useful goods or coercive
power (see, for example, Bush and Mayer 1974; Umbeck 1981; Hirshleifer 1988,
1995, 2001; Skaperdas 1992, 2003; Anderson and McChesney 1994; Anderson
and Hill 2004; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997; Neary 1997; Grossman 1998;
Grossman and Kim 2002; Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002).1 While this assumption
is reasonable in many cases, it is not in many others. For instance, if one player
1 For a superb discussion of the emergence of property rights and their defense in the absence of
formal enforcement, see also Anderson and McChesney (2002).
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has a monopoly on the technology of greatest violence, the other may be severely
limited in his or her ability to invest in strength for the purpose of defense or
aggression. In these models, introducing severe limitations on the ability of
certain agents to invest in additional strength leads to a situation in which those
who are not so constrained plunder those who are. Permanently weak agents
cannot avoid violent theft in equilibrium (see, for instance, Hausken 2004).
With both multilateral punishment and investment in greater strength elim-
inated as means for coping with the threat of violent theft, it would seem that
there is no way for permanently weak individuals to exchange with stronger
ones. Despite this, I contend that trade between permanently weak and per-
manently strong individuals is possible without government. Weaker individuals’
inability to rely on mechanisms described by the folk theorem and to invest in
force for defense or aggression does not prevent them from making exchange
with bandits self-enforcing in the face of threats of violent theft.
To examine my hypothesis, I consider the case of late precolonial Africa.2
European settlers on the west coast of Africa employed middlemen to collect
the goods they needed for export from producers in the remote interior of Central
Africa.3 In addition to this, some Africans operated as middlemen on their own
account—connecting European exporters and others with producers in the in-
terior. Caravans of traveling middlemen were frequently stronger than the com-
munities of producers with whom they interacted. They were thus tempted to
overwhelm these communities with force and steal the goods they desired rather
than trading for them.4
I argue that communities of producers used two mechanisms to transform
middlemen’s equilibrium strategy from banditry to peaceful trade. First, I discuss
producers’ use of credit as a means of enhancing the efficiency of producer-
middleman exchange relations. Second, I look at producers’ demands for tribute
from middlemen as a kind of risk premium promoting producers’ ability to
interact with traveling traders. These mechanisms are new in that, until now,
they have not been used to explain how agents make exchange self-enforcing in
the face of threats of violent theft.5
Because multilateral punishment cannot create cooperation where one class
is permanently weak, unlike most models of self-enforcing exchange, mine does
not rely on reputation or repeated play to achieve cooperation. Similarly, since
2 For a classic treatment of West African trade in the colonial period through the early 1950s, see
Bauer (1954).
3 As Serpa Pinto (1881, p. 22) summarized it, “[T]rade in Africa was divisible into two branches,
viz. the purchasing of goods from the whites and selling them the produce of the country, and
purchasing such produce from the blacks and selling to them the aforesaid goods.” This trade was
conducted by traveling middlemen.
4 The problem I consider here is somewhat analogous to a violent version of the traditional holdup
problem discussed by Williamson (1975, 1985), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), and Hart and
Moore (1988), among others.
5 For an excellent and pioneering discussion on institutions of credible commitment in the context
of violent conflict, see Schelling (1960).
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one class of players is unable to substantially affect its strength through invest-
ment, the emphasis of my analysis shifts from individuals’ optimal investments
in coercive capital (the focus in existing models that deal with violence) to the
strategies employed by permanently weaker individuals to alter the incentive of
stronger agents for trade versus banditry.6
To examine these strategies, I utilize primary-source materials regarding in-
teraction between middlemen and producers in west central Africa in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. These sources are composed from the in-depth
reports of about 20 European travelers to the area during this period. Many of
these travelers were themselves traders, while others were explorers interested in
learning more about the state of African trade for their home countries and
spreading the word of Christianity.
2. The Context of Producer-Middleman Relations in
Late Precolonial Africa
In examining late precolonial interaction between middlemen and producers
in west central Africa, this paper deals primarily with the inhabitants around
the Upper Zambezi and Kasai, Portuguese-speaking settlers along the Angolan
coast, and the middlemen they employed.7 Middlemen typically traveled in car-
avans and were constantly on the move.8 These caravans consisted of other free
middlemen, security charged with protecting the caravan on the road, and often
a great number of slaves who carried the items for sale. Caravans ranged in size
from tens to thousands, although on the basis of the evidence available in trav-
elers’ reports, the modal caravan consisted of about 70 or 80 people (Miller
1988, p. 191; Cameron 1877, p. 251; Soremekun 1977, p. 87; Capello and Ivens
1969, 1:17–18; Dias de Carvalho 1890, pp. 186, 192, 193, 700; Harding 1905, p.
214; Johnston 1893, p. 34). Common imports carried by traveling traders to the
interior included tobacco, gin, beads, shells, and brass, which were used as body
ornaments, cloth, and firearms. As the sole suppliers of firearms to interior
communities, middlemen controlled the weaponry reaching producers of goods
and thus typically had the upper hand when it came to implements used in
fighting.9
6 Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) consider the case in which the stronger party finds
it in his or her interest to establish permanent hegemony over the weaker individuals. If his or her
interest is stable and encompassing, and the ruler is sufficiently patient, he or she can make more
this way than by sporadically pillaging weaker parties. This paper considers the use of informal
mechanisms that create a cheaper means for stronger agents to credibly commit not to plunder
weaker ones than establishing government over them.
7 Interaction between middlemen and producers in the interior of west central Africa appears to
have begun around 1790 (Botelho de Vasconcellos [1844] 1873).
8 Capello and Ivens (1969, 1:103), for example, described the middlemen of Bihe as “eminently
devoted to traveling.”
9 There is no evidence to suggest that middlemen were cartelized or in any way coordinated their
actions to prevent arms from reaching producers. Nevertheless, they appear to have infrequently
supplied firearms to producers.
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Producers consisted of village chiefs, or headmen, and their citizens in the
remote interior. These individuals rarely traveled far beyond the bounds of their
communities where the resources used in production could be found.10 Their
immobility was strengthened by the costliness of spending significant time away
from home, especially in light of the fact that, as producers, traveling for, say,
the purposes of trade was not to their comparative advantage. In this way,
specialization contributed to their immobility. Since I consider exchange in the
postslave export era, commodities supplied by these individuals consisted mostly
of ivory, beeswax, and wild rubber. Despite the fact that slave trading was pro-
hibited in Angola in 1836, however, slaves continued to be a source of profit to
traveling traders who obtained slaves both for illegal sale to coastal traders11 and
for sale to other African communities.
In the nineteenth century, most of interior west central Africa consisted of
disparate communities ruled by chiefs who decided over disagreements among
their citizens, including those that dealt with credit and exchange. The relation-
ship of ruler to ruled in these societies was considerably less formal than a
modern Western notion of government would imply.12 Furthermore, the presence
of numerous sovereigns created a vacuum of authority for interactions involving
the members of different communities. In this sense, it is reasonable to speak
of these societies as quasi stateless in that mechanisms of enforcement between
communities and, to a lesser extent, within communities were overwhelmingly
informal. As two European travelers characterized a portion of the interior they
visited, for example, “[I]t is only in extraordinary cases that one can suspect that
such a thing as a law exists” (Capello and Ivens 1969, 2:242; see also 1:183).13
On the European side, crown-established governors ruled Portuguese settle-
ments on the coast and oversaw trade posts they set up slightly further inland.
Of course, the laws of these settlements did not formally bind Africans in the
interior. Nor did the customs of interior African communities formally bind the
inhabitants of these settlements. The presence of multiple states in west central
Africa—both those of indigenous communities and those of European settle-
ments—created ungoverned interstices for interactions between these people.
10 While some indigenous precolonial agents inside the remote interior of west central Africa
migrated within the areas composing this region, very few migrated outside of it, and these were
not producers. According to Capello and Ivens, “The natives of T’Chiboco,” for instance, “seldom
travel beyond their own country, and it is a rare sight to behold a caravan of Ma-quioco journeying
westward for the purposes of trade” (1969, 1:225; see also Serpa Pinto 1881, p. 255; Harding 1905,
p. 307).
11 According to Crawford (1914, p. 28), for instance, the governor at Benguela allowed illicit slave
trading to go on under his watch.
12 As Livingstone (1963, p. 410) observed, for instance, “So far as I can at present understand,
there are no such things as nations or kingdoms in the interior of Africa.” See also Capello and
Ivens (1969, 2:49, 2:242).
13 Even where colonial outposts had been established, formal authority was not really effective.
For instance, as Arnot commented, “Though Bailundu and Bihe are within the province of Benguella,
Portuguese authority has not very much influence there” (1889, p. 111; see also Harding 1905, p.
306; Johnston 1893, p. 59).
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2.1. The Threat of Violent Theft
To profit, middlemen needed to obtain the goods of producers in the interior
of Central Africa and bring them to outlying communities and coastal exporters.
These goods could be obtained in one of two ways, peaceful trade or violent
theft. In connecting stationary producers with people outside the narrow bounds
of their communities, middlemen had the capacity to enable producers to realize
significant gains from exchange they would have been otherwise unable to cap-
ture.14 The fact that they tended to be stronger than the communities of producers
with whom they interacted, however, created a situation in which middlemen
were tempted to use force rather than trade to realize their ends (see, for instance,
Harding 1905, pp. 93, 108, 124, 138; Cameron 1877, pp. 226, 253, 292, 331,
472; Johnston 1893, pp. 40–41; Gibbons 1904, 1:67; Livingstone 1874, 2:29; 1857,
pp. 180, 297; 1960, p. 277; 1963, 1:12). As Cameron (1877, p. 393) observed,
for example, left unchecked, caravans “profited by rapine and robbery in passing
through countries where people did not possess guns.”15 Thus, a potentially highly
beneficial situation for producers could easily turn into a massively harmful one.
Like all behavior, the decision to engage in banditry over trade is guided by
the relative marginal cost and marginal benefit of these alternative modes of
action. Sufficiently superior strength lowers the marginal cost of plunder below
that of trade as a means of obtaining desired goods. Where an individual is
strong enough to take what he or she wants with little or no resistance, it is
cheaper to steal than to pay for the desired objects. His or her payoff-maximizing
strategy is therefore to violently overwhelm weaker agents.
Two primary features of middlemen accounted for the fact that they were
often the stronger force in interactions with interior producers. First, as noted
above, middlemen were the source of modern weaponry for producers. Producers
by themselves had no access to guns except by way of those sold or given to
them by traveling traders. By controlling the quantity and quality of firearms
reaching interior communities, middlemen could effectively secure their strength
superiority, giving them a decisive advantage should they decide to attack these
communities. This advantage was heightened by the fact that usually “in the
interior . . . the villages are open and unprotected,” making producers easy
targets for better armed middlemen (Serpa Pinto 1881, 1:177). Clearly, this
advantage was not always sufficient to ensure victory in an attack. If a caravan
was sufficiently small and the community it attempted to plunder was sufficiently
14 As two travelers to the interior put it, “Commerce, by obliging them [traveling traders] to make
repeated journeys, carries with it, as a necessary consequence, the establishment of relations and the
making of contracts with distant peoples” (Capello and Ivens 1969, 2:18).
15 Caravan leaders often made this bad situation worse by encouraging their groups to steal from
the villages to which they traveled. Leaders were usually responsible for providing their group’s
provisions on the road, and provisions became very costly when caravans were large (see, for instance,
Serpa Pinto 1881, 1:165). Theft was thus sometimes promoted as a cost-cutting measure. As Cameron
(1877, p. 259) observed, for example, “At Kwakasongo there is an Arab settlement of some size.
. . . [T]hey send out their caravans. . . . These fellows get no pay, but are allowed to loot the
country all round in search of subsistence and slaves.”
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large, better weaponry was meaningless. Of course, overcoming this potential
obstacle to banditry was not all that difficult. Middlemen simply needed to be
selective about the communities they targeted for attack.
Second, middlemen were highly mobile, and producers were highly stationary.
This meant two things for middlemen’s success in plundering expeditions. On
the one hand, middlemen could always return to the coast or their home bases
near the coast and gather additional members if greater numbers were needed
to succeed in violently stealing from interior communities of producers. Perhaps
even more important, however, the relative immobility of producers meant that
middlemen could escape from conflict with their booty by fleeing to the coast
without much worry that they would be overtaken later by bands of producers
who would need to locate, track down,16 and recover what had been stolen.17
2.2. Modeling the Threat of Violent Theft
Modeling the threat of the violent theft that producers confronted is straight-
forward. Consider an economy of complete and perfect information with one
community of producers and one caravan of middlemen. Because it is stationary
and sufficiently weaker than the caravan of middlemen, the community of pro-
ducers does not have a choice about whether or not it will interact with mid-
dlemen. If the caravan approaches the community of producers, it cannot avoid
interaction. Multilateral punishment, which requires the ability to terminate
future interaction in the event of noncooperative behavior, is therefore not an
effective strategy for preventing banditry here. While the community of producers
does not control whether or not it will interact with the caravan that approaches
it, it does control a different variable of the game—how much it produces.
Producers move first and decide whether to produce for trade or for subsis-
tence. Producing for trade means producing a relatively large quantity of goods
that producers may either consume or use for immediate trade with the caravan
if it approaches them. Producing for subsistence means producing a small quan-
tity of goods just larger than necessary for producers’ personal consumption.
Production for trade therefore involves a surplus stock of goods that affords
producers additional consumption and additional trade, while production for
subsistence involves a stock just large enough to sustain the population and
permits only a minimal level of trade.
The caravan of middlemen moves second and chooses to do one of the fol-
lowing: stay home, that is, not travel to the community of producers at all; travel
16 According to Crawford (1914, pp. 22–23), agents in west central Africa at this time also frequently
changed their names. This, of course, would have contributed to the difficulty of tracking down
violent middlemen. However, it remains unclear how pervasive this practice was.
17 A third reason for middlemen’s strength superiority could also be added. Namely, the fact that
they were mobile and producers were stationary meant that middlemen had the ability to initiate
surprise attacks on communities of producers. This may help to explain Serpa Pinto’s (1881, 1:178)
comment, “It is a noteworthy circumstance connected with wars in this part of the Africa, that the
attacking party is ever the victor.”
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to the community of producers and trade; or travel to the community of pro-
ducers and plunder. Following the discussion in Section 2, the caravan’s attempt
to plunder is always successful and met without resistance such that the com-
munity loses all it has produced when it is plundered.
If producers produce for trade and middlemen stay home, producers receive
and middlemen receive —what each can earn without interacting withH Hp m
the other. If middlemen trade, both producers and middlemen earn a higher
payoff from exchanging, and , respectively, where is middlemen’s payoffE E Ep m m
net of traveling expenses. If middlemen plunder, they receive an even higher
payoff yet, which when travel expenses are deducted gives them P. Producers,
on the other hand, receive their lowest payoff in this case,  .Hp
The situation is similar if producers produce for subsistence, but the payoffs
change because a smaller stock of goods is available for producers to consume,
for middlemen to violently take if they choose to plunder, and for producers to
trade with middlemen if middlemen decide to exchange. Only middlemen’s
payoff from staying home, which is unaffected by the stock of goods producers
keep on hand, does not change when producers produce for subsistence. Thus,
if producers produce for subsistence and middlemen stay home, middlemen
continue to earn . Producers, however, earn less. Because the inconvenienceHm
of producing just enough to sustain the community is costly, producers receive
a payoff of only where is equal to minus the value they place on theh , h Hp p p
forgone stock in consumptive uses. If middlemen plunder, producers receive
 , which is their smallest payoff when they produce for subsistence but whichhp
is larger than what they receive when middlemen plunder and they produce for
trade ( ). Middlemen in this case earn p, which is more than they earn byHp
trading but, because there is so little to steal, is smaller than the payoff of staying
home Finally, if middlemen trade, producers earn , which is smaller than(H ). em p
what they earn from trade when they produce for trade (because there is a
smaller stock available for trading) but which is still their highest payoff when
they produce for subsistence. Middlemen in this event earn , their smallestem
payoff, which includes the cost of travel. To summarize, for producers, E 1p
, and for middlemen, , whereH 1 e 1 h P 1 E 1 H 1 p 1 e E  E 1p p p m m m p m
, which is to say that the higher level of trade is socially efficient. ThisP  Hp
game is depicted in Figure 1.
The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game involves producers
producing for subsistence and traveling traders staying home. If they produce
more, producers increase middlemen’s payoff from banditry by making more
available to steal. This entices middlemen to plunder, which generates losses for
producers. To avoid these losses, producers produce only what is needed to
sustain themselves. As a result, there is little available for theft, which creates a
situation for middlemen in which staying home yields a higher return than
plundering. In equilibrium, producers earn and middlemen earn more, .h Hp m
Producers pay for their strength inferiority by incurring the cost associated with
reducing stocks to a level that prevents middlemen from engaging in banditry.
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Figure 1. The threat of violent theft
In discouraging middlemen from interacting with them, producers also forgo
significant potential gains from trade. The threat of being plundered, however,
did not prevent trade between middlemen and producers in the late precolonial
period. Indeed, legitimate exports supplied by remote interior producers leaving
Angola alone amounted to close to $4 million per year by the end of the nine-
teenth century (Vellut 1979, p. 101). How did producers overcome the threat
of violent theft posed by trading with bandits?
3. A Clever Use of Credit: You Can’t Steal What’s Not There,
but You Can Trade with It
To capture the gains from trade with middlemen, producers required a strategy
that would keep middlemen’s payoff from plunder below the payoff from staying
home, as in the case in which they produced for subsistence, but raise middle-
men’s payoff from trade above the payoff from staying home, as in the case in
which they produced for trade. Credit made these two seemingly incompatible
goals possible. Although middlemen could not steal goods that did not yet exist,
credit enabled producers to trade with goods that did not yet exist. By keeping
current stocks low but exchanging with middlemen on credit, producers could
produce for subsistence, thus deterring plunder but still enabling trade, which
would allow both sides to reap the benefits from exchange.
To see explicitly how the use of such credit arrangements enhanced producer-
middleman exchange, consider the game in Figure 2. This game is like that from
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Figure 2. A clever use of credit
Figure 1, only now when producers produce for subsistence, let middlemen’s
trade strategy be trade on credit rather than simultaneous exchange. This mod-
ification makes the analysis dynamic. When trade on credit is chosen, each round
is composed of two subperiods: one in which middlemen provide credit and
another in which, if producers have produced, exchange takes place, and if they
have not, they are plundered to clear off as much of the debt as possible.18
The payoffs on the Produce for Trade branch of the tree remain the same as
before. Likewise, the payoffs from {Produce for Subsistence, Stay Home} and
{Produce for Subsistence, Plunder} remain the same. However, because it now
involves trading on credit, which increases the volume of exchange that is pos-
sible, the payoff of trade under subsistence production rises.
Since credit is provided in the first subperiod, middlemen receive what they
are owed in the second subperiod only if production has actually occurred. If
middlemen provide credit and producers subsequently produce, producers re-
ceive the same payoff as when they produce for trade and middlemen trade
under the Produce for Trade branch of the tree, . Middlemen, on the otherEp
hand, earn , where d is the caravan’s discount factor and ThedE d  (0, 1).m
reason for discounting middlemen’s payoff is straightforward. Because trade in
this case is conducted on credit in the first subperiod, middlemen only receive
all or part of the gains from exchange via repayment in the second subperiod.
18 For instance, when the traveling trader “Hassani of Dugumbe got [a] chief into debt” and the
chief could not repay, Hassani “robbed him of ten men and ten goats to clear off the debt” (Livingstone
1874, 2:35).
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If after receiving credit in the first subperiod, when the caravan arrives to receive
payment in the second subperiod, producers have not produced, middlemen
punish them by plundering what is available. If this happens, producers receive
—what they received on credit in subperiod 1, less the discounted valueE  dhp p
of what is taken from them in subperiod 2. Middlemen, on the other hand,
receive —the discounted value of what they are able to take as compensationdp
in subperiod 2.
What course of action the caravan of middlemen now finds most profitable
depends on its discount rate and the credibility of producers’ promises to produce
in subperiod 2. Where and producers can credibly commit to produce,d 1 H /Em m
trade is more profitable for the caravan than staying home. Where d does not
satisfy this inequality or producers cannot credibly commit to produce, the
caravan finds staying home more profitable. Since for anyE 1 E  dh d p p p
and , producers can credibly commit to produce for re-(0, 1) E 1 h 1 Hp p p
payment in subperiod 2. Given this, for middlemen whose discount rates satisfy
, trading on credit is the payoff-maximizing strategy. For middlemend 1 H /Em m
whose discount rates do not satisfy this inequality, staying home is payoff max-
imizing. In equilibrium, the caravan travels to the community of producers only
if it is going to trade (on credit) and stays home if the caravan poses a threat
of violence. Plunder is therefore avoided, and producers and middlemen who
are sufficiently patient realize the gains from exchange.
The use of credit for this purpose in producer-middleman exchange was
ubiquitous. As the traveling trader Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho put it,
“[T]he trader sees himself forced to give credits, and this is indispensable for
anyone who takes the risk of trading in such a region, if he wants to do it with
any success” (1890, p. 700; translation from Oppen 1994). Producers’ efforts to
keep stocks of “thievable” goods low was considerably eased by the fact that
many of the goods desired by middlemen—for instance, ivory, rubber, and wax—
required harvesting before they were available in exportable form. These goods
remained in the ground, so to speak, until collected by producers. To keep stocks
perpetually low, producers protracted the process of debt repayment (see, for
instance, Cameron 1877, p. 47; Livingstone 1874, 1:305; Dias de Carvalho 1890,
p. 699). Consider, for example, the observation of a European traveler to the
Upper Zambezi and Kasai, Paul Pogge:
The native would be little inclined to gather the products of his country, were he not
given the payment in advance. . . . [Ambaquista middlemen—A.v.O.] can buy some
products in the interior, these being brought to them by the natives and paid [imme-
diately]. . . . In general, however, they cannot purchase very many commodities in this
way but instead give the native credit. Where rubber occurs in the forest, and where the
elephant occurs, the Baptist [Ambaquista] gives payment in advance to the elephant hunter
for so and so many tusks, and to the one who wants to bring rubber or beeswax payment
for so and so many pounds of rubber or wax. These people then have to wait for months
314 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
and years until their debtors satisfy them (Oppen 1994, pp. 397–98; emphasis added [trans-
lation of Pogge 1880, p. 16]; see also Buchner 1883, p. 82).
The goods that producers desired that middlemen extend to them on credit—
for instance, alcohol, cloth, and tobacco—were typically the kind of goods that
producers consumed shortly after receiving them. Middlemen were therefore
not able to extend goods to producers on credit and then retake them by force
when they returned to a village to receive an installment of debt repayment.
Obviously, however, producers could not reduce their stocks of goods to zero.
They needed to keep some provisions on hand to survive. In addition, some
goods desired by traveling traders—for instance, slaves—could not be made
unavailable in the way that others could. There was consequently always some-
thing available for stronger middlemen to steal if they so desired. Nevertheless,
by significantly reducing their holdings, producers could concomitantly reduce
the benefits of violent theft to middlemen bent on banditry. Furthermore, it was
unnecessary for producers to reduce their stock of goods to zero to have the
desired effect. As long as stocks were kept low enough that the value of the
goods available for plunder was lower than the payoff from trading on credit,
middlemen would trade with producers rather than plunder them.
The pattern of historical references to producer-middleman credit agreements
closely tracks the declining importance of slaves and rising importance of ivory,
rubber, and wax from the 1840s and 1850s onward following the abolition of
Angolan slave trading in 1836 and then slavery itself in 1858. In the first half
of the nineteenth century, credit agreements are rarely mentioned.19 In the second
half of the century, however, they are common. This reflects the fact that, for
reasons discussed above, the credit mechanism was not especially effective in
preventing plunder by middlemen seeking slaves but was highly effective in
preventing plunder by middlemen seeking other goods.
While my model considers the bilateral case, in actuality multiple caravans of
middlemen interacted with multiple communities of producers.20 The presence
of multiple communities of producers and caravans introduced the possibility
of one caravan plundering the goods harvested by producers to repay another
caravan as part of a previous credit agreement. For two reasons, however, it
seems unlikely that caravans could effectively pursue this strategy. First, for such
theft to be effective, caravans would require specific knowledge of when the
goods produced to repay other caravans were available for stealing before they
had been collected.
Second, caravans had strong incentives to ensure that other crews of middle-
men would not plunder the goods owed to them. The use of credit created a
stake for middlemen in the well-being of producers. By indebting themselves to
19 Where credit is mentioned, producers rather than middlemen were the creditors. See, for instance,
Baptista (1873).
20 For instance, Buchner refers to Mwant Yav’s “business relations with a number of traders from
the coastal areas” (Oppen 1994, p. 360 [translation of Buchner 1883, p. 62).
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middlemen, producers transformed their status in the eyes of these traders from
targets of violence to productive assets. To produce the goods necessary to repay
their debts, producers needed to be alive and well. It was therefore in the interest
of middlemen to ensure the health and safety of those to whom they made loans.
To protect their valued investments, middlemen had an incentive to abstain from
using violence against producers who owed them goods and to deter other
middlemen from using violence against these producers. One way they accom-
plished this was by punishing middlemen who wronged them. For instance, as
Arnot (1889, p. 179) records in one case, “[T]hree Garganze caravans had been
plundered and many men killed—one at Bihe, another in the Lovale country,
the third in the Lunda country, but all at the instigation of Bihe chiefs and
traders, who thought that they had been unjustly dealt with in certain business
transactions they had with Msidi.”
It is not clear whether certain caravans were able to establish monopoly control
over some areas. Securing an effective monopoly would require a significant,
lasting strength disparity between caravans such that potential competitors could
be forcibly excluded from trade with particular villages. Such a disparity may
have existed in some instances, but clearly did not in many others. A monopoly
caravan would create quite unfavorable terms of trade for producers. In principle,
monopoly middlemen could get away with paying producers just slightly more
than their payoff of producing for subsistence and not trading on credit (pro-
ducers’ equilibrium payoff from Figure 1). Where competition was absent then,
it would be reasonable to expect poor bargaining power among producers and
near-subsistence wages. However, the historical record indicates that for some
producers quite the opposite prevailed. As one traveler complained about the
villagers he encountered, for example, “[T]he people being satiated with cloth,
owing to their constant intercourse with the coast, would sell us nothing, or
asked higher prices than we could afford” (Cameron 1877, p. 390).
4. Tribute as a Risk Premium
In communities where wealth was predominantly held in the form of humans
(slaves) and livestock, producers were constrained in their ability to reduce the
size of their thievable stocks. As long as stocks were not so large as to make
banditry more profitable than trading on credit regardless of a caravan’s discount
rate, sufficiently patient caravans continued to find trading on credit the most
profitable course of action. To see this, consider a community that, because it
holds much of its wealth in the form of humans and livestock, cannot reduce
its stock of goods as low as other communities that do not hold most of their
wealth in these forms. The benefit of plundering this community is therefore
higher, W, where Despite this, if , there exists some caravan thatW 1 H . W ! Em m
will continue to find the payoff from trading on credit to be greater than(dE )m
the payoff from plundering Specifically, where , caravans with(W). H ! W ! Em m
discount rates that satisfy will trade on credit.d 1 W/Em
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However, caravans with discount rates where will not. In fact, becaused ! W/Em
, some caravans that would rather stay home than trade on credit withW 1 Hm
producers who can reduce their stock of thievable goods sufficiently would rather
plunder producers who cannot do this than stay home. For these middlemen,
banditry is the most profitable course of action in this case. Thus, while producers
who could reduce their stocks sufficiently were safe from plunder and could
trade with bandits, those who held their wealth in the form of humans and
livestock could not. Sufficiently patient middlemen would trade with them on
credit, but impatient ones would plunder them.
To overcome this problem, communities of vulnerable producers demanded
tribute from traveling traders who approached them for exchange. Typically,
village headmen21 were the gatekeepers to producers and required middlemen
to meet their tribute demands before trade relations could be consummated.22
As the prominent middleman Antonio Francisco Ferreira da Silva Porto recorded,
for example, tribute payment “‘was necessary to open the door!’ We tried to find
the solution to this enigma and found out that it was necessary to give some
pannos [yards of cloth—A.v.O.] to obtain permission for the people of the
caravan and of the country to buy and sell provisions and other commodities,
without which nothing could be done” (Silva Porto 1885, p. 580 [translation
from Oppen 1994, p. 390]; see also Crawford 1914, p. 118; Harding 1905, p.
148).
The way tribute worked is straightforward. Let caravans of middlemen be
heterogeneous in discount rates such that r is the proportion of caravans with
discount rates that satisfy and is the proportion of caravans withd 1 W/E 1  rm
discount rates that do not satisfy this inequality. Obviously, if a caravan of
middlemen was excessively impatient and so intended to plunder a community,
demanding tribute was worthless. The stronger caravan would simply overwhelm
the community, refuse tribute payment, and go about violently stealing what it
21 Tribute was sometimes kept and consumed by the chief, or headman, who received it. This did
not, however, inhibit tribute’s usefulness as compensation for the cost imposed on villagers by violent
middlemen. Occasionally, local rulers would declare a monopoly right to trade with middlemen who
approached them. In this event, tribute functioned as a premium offsetting the ruler’s risk of trading
with the outsider. In addition, tribute consumed by local leaders indirectly reached villagers in the
form of public investments undertaken by the ruler, for which tribute was his pay. For instance,
resolving community disputes (via arbitration) was a common duty of rulers, as was generally
maintaining community order. Likewise, rulers could be charged with providing food in the event
the community encountered hard times—a form of social insurance. Tribute collected and consumed
by a chief functioned as payment for performing such public services, indirectly compensating
community members for the risk posed by impatient middlemen.
22 As noted previously, some chiefs, or headmen, had coercive power. When this power was greater
than that of a visitor, he could use this to coerce tribute payment. More often than not, however,
for reasons described above, it seems that this was not the case. Instead the power of chiefs was in
(1) preventing access to their community. This was the case, for instance, if a river separated a chief’s
community and those desiring to visit it and the canoe was on the chief’s side of the river (see, for
instance, Cameron 1877, p. 266). The power of the chiefs was also in (2) refusing to furnish guides
or assistants to visitors who did not know the area or how to safely get to the next village or who
required additional protection when traveling between villages, and so on.
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desired. For those caravans that were not too impatient, however, demanding
tribute was effective.
These middlemen found peaceful exchange more profitable than plunder and
were therefore willing to pay for the opportunity to trade. Where producers
cannot reduce their stocks sufficiently and the resulting benefit from plunder is
W, their expected payoff of producing for subsistence and trading on credit is
given by , which is greater than producers’ expected payoffr(E )  (1  r)(h )p p
of producing for subsistence and not trading on credit for any . Sufficientlyr 1 0
patient middlemen earn when producers agree to trade on credit anddE 1 Wm
W when they do not. This being the case, producers could demand tribute T
from sufficiently patient middlemen in order to exchange with them on credit,
where , and these middlemen would pay this (in addition to thoseT ≤ dE  Wm
others cited here, see, for instance, Arnot 1889, pp. 71, 80, 102, 135, 136, 137,
151, 159, 204; 1893, p. 26; Harding 1905, pp. 81, 95–96, 142, 148, 290; Serpa
Pinto 1881, 1:67–68, 1:90, 1:175, 1:228–29; Graca 1890; Johnston 1893, p. 111;
Capello and Ivens 1969, 1:87, 1:116–17, 1:137–38; Livingstone 1963, 1:9, 1:33,
1:98; Cameron 1877, p. 77).23 Thus, “it is not surprising that tribute is paid to
the [every] village headman where one sets up the camp” (Silva Porto 1885, p.
577; translation from Oppen 1994).
Tribute demands acted as a risk premium charged by communities of vul-
nerable producers. They helped to protect producers against the risk of inter-
acting with traveling traders who, as a general class, consisted of some patient
and some impatient members. In particular, tribute acted as a tax on patient
middlemen that was used to subsidize the banditry of violent impatient mid-
dlemen. By taxing middlemen who expressed a desire to exchange, producers
were able to extract compensation from patient middlemen (who traded with
them) to cover losses imposed by impatient ones (who plundered them).24 This
helps to explain François Coillard’s (1897, p. 611) remark about the Luvale
chief—Chief Kakenge—when he noted the “homage or rather a tax he exacts
from black Portuguese traders who enter his country.”
Often, although not always, tribute took two forms: goods that producers
consumed immediately or shortly after receiving them, for instance, an ox that
would be slaughtered and eaten right away, alcohol, or tobacco; or European
novelties (for example, a watch) that were not sought by middlemen to bring
23 It should also be noted that as the proportion of impatient caravans in the population increases,
the credibility of producers’ threat to not trade on credit with those who refuse to pay tribute
increases as well. As , the gains producers forgo by adhering to this strategy fall.r r 0
24 Where the total population of middlemen is v, producers generate in revenue from de-rvT
manding tribute, which is used to help offset losses in the amount To completely(1  r)v(h ).p
offset the losses imposed by impatient middlemen, As already noted, how-T p [(1  r)(h )]/r.p
ever, the amount producers could demand in tribute was bound at the upper limit by dE  W.m
Whether or not full compensation was possible therefore depended on how much greater the payoff
of trade was over the payoff of plunder for patient middlemen (which in turn depends on how
patient patient middlemen are), the proportion of impatient middlemen in the population, and the
value of the stock lost in the event of plunder (which, of course, depends on the extent to which
producers are able to reduce their stocks).
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to coastal European traders for export. The reason for this is clear—to avoid
tribute payments contributing to vulnerable communities’ stocks of thievable
goods. If tribute was either consumed quickly or consisted of goods middlemen
were not looking for, producers did not need to fear losing it to banditry by a
violent caravan.25
Key to its usefulness as a risk premium, tribute also needed to constitute a
net gain to recipient producers. This ruled out the possibility of present recip-
rocation, as was practiced in gift exchange arrangements between some villages.26
Thus, although communities of producers often offered traveling traders food
or temporary shelter after receiving tribute, these “gifts” were worth substantially
less than those they demanded (Miller 1970, p. 193), which left a large effective
premium in place. Noting this value discrepancy, Livingstone, for instance, com-
plained, “[T]he Negroes do not seem to have the smallest idea of presents being
reciprocal” (1963, p. 253; see also, Harding 1905, pp. 192, 290).
5. Conclusion
My analysis leads to three conclusions. First, individuals can in fact trade with
bandits. Conventional wisdom underestimates the market’s power to solve the
problem of violent theft. Even in the extreme case where weak individuals cannot
use multilateral punishment or invest in additional strength to fend off stronger
ones, the absence of state policing need not bring exchange activities to a halt.
While the potential for violent theft poses a significant threat to the ability of
individuals to realize the gains from trade, the benefits of preventing this threat
from becoming a reality compel agents to develop informal solutions to the
problem of banditry. By altering the cost-benefit structure of trade versus vio-
lence, these solutions have in common the fact that they transform stronger
agents’ incentive from plunder to peaceful exchange.
Second, although credit is often the cause of commitment problems involving
peaceful theft, it serves as a solution to the problem of violent theft where one
party to an interaction is stronger and more mobile than the other. By minimizing
stocks of desired goods and trading on credit, vulnerable parties simultaneously
reduce the benefit of violent theft by stronger individuals who are tempted to
take advantage of their superior strength and increase the benefit of exchange.
Third, to the extent that some stronger individuals are prone to use force to
25 The fact that thievable goods were sometimes demanded as tribute is attributable to two possible
factors. On the one hand, this may reflect that some communities of producers assigned a relatively
low probability to being plundered by a caravan of violent middlemen. On the other hand, even
though the tribute a community received—say, a slave—would ultimately be stolen by a violent
caravan, in the time between when the community received it and the time it was stolen, the
employment of the slave yielded some benefit to the community. If the slave were needed enough,
this benefit could outweigh the benefit of a nonthievable tribute, even though its employment would
not be permanent. In this case, the slave would be preferred as tribute to say, an ox, even though
the former was at risk for theft while the latter was not.
26 For an excellent analysis of the gift exchange system see Landa (1994).
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obtain the goods they desire and others are inclined to trade (owing to a difference
in discount rates), agents who are part of a weaker group may be able to protect
themselves against the risk of interacting with members of a stronger group by
demanding a premium from them in order to exchange. Although permanently
weak agents cannot refuse to interact with stronger individuals who want what
they have, weak individuals can refuse to exchange on credit with stronger
individuals because the goods in question do not yet exist. Members of the
stronger group who are inclined to trade rather than plunder will therefore pay
this premium when it is required for them to enable exchange. This premium
helps to offset the losses experienced by members of the weaker group when
they interact with members of the stronger group who are prone to use force
to obtain what they desire. By compensating vulnerable agents for the risk of
interacting with unknown members of the stronger group, this premium makes
exchange possible despite the risk inherent for permanently weaker agents.
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